Bank Runs and Self-Insured Bank Deposits

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发布时间：2013-09-13

Topic:

Bank Runs and Self-Insured Bank Deposits

Time:

星期四,2013-09-13 10:30-12:00

Venue:

Room 505, Datong Building West Huaihai Road 211, SAIF

Speaker:

Liheng Xu

Bank Runs and Self-Insured Bank Deposits

This paper studies bank runs in an extended Diamond and Dybvig model. The model is extended in two ways. One, agents have heterogeneous wealth and two, banks can invest in both liquid and illiquid assets. We argue that the underlying reason for bank runs is ambiguous property rights. Sequential conversion is an example of such ambiguity. Demand deposit insurance eliminates this ambiguity. In this regard, we characterize conditions on the economy where banks can preclude bank runs as an equilibrium by self-insuring their deposits with an FDIC deposit insurance like contract.

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